II. BACKGROUND
The Second Hague Conference held in 1907 traces its roots to the First Hague Conference of 1899. As peace sentiments grew throughout Europe following the Napoleonic Wars, it was the initiative of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia that led to the First Conference. The Hague was chosen as the venue for the gathering, which convened on May 18th, 1899 and coincided with the birthday of the Tsar (Hull, 1970, p.2). The Conference was divided into three commissions: limitation of armaments, laws of war, and arbitration. The first commission dealt with restricting the production and expansion of new weapons. Germany had strongly disagreed to any limitations on armaments (Davis, 1975, p. 33), signaling the rocky path that the Conference was undertaking. Considering the balance of power tactics utilized by the European powers of the era, it was not surprising that the major powers of the time had reservations relating to containment of arms advancement and production. Thus, the commission related to arms limitation concluded on the possibility of an agreement in the future, which in no way limited advancement or production of armaments.
The laws of war also faced a similar fate, with a majority of the propositions including prohibitions of marine cannons and torpedo boats, as well as neutrality rights of neutral states being deferred until the next conference (Hull, 1970, pp.450-453). The only exception was the development of what it seemed like a rudimentary version of a world court, named the Permanent Court of Arbitration. It was limited to interpreting arbitrary laws that were taken up by the parties involved (Scott, 1972, p.81). Thus, the First Hague Conference left many unanswered questions, hinting to the possibility of future international conferences.
The seeds of the Second Hague Conference were sowed in the United States. It started with the presentation of a list of resolutions adopted by the organization of international lawmakers called the Interparliamentary Union in 1904. The organization called for a review of the subjects postponed during the First Hague Conference, negotiation of arbitration treaties, and the establishment of an international congress to discuss global issues (Scott, 1972, p.90). The then US president Theodore Roosevelt took upon the endeavor and allowed for it to develop further. Roosevelt’s Secretary of State John Hay drafted circular notes on arbitration treaties and materials for the New Hague conference, as President Roosevelt called for a second peace conference (Davis, 1975, p.112). Considering the fact that the Russians were the ones who initiated the First Hague Conference, the Americans deferred the organizing of the conference to them. The Russians collaborated with the Dutch to plan the second peace conference in The Hague (Scott, 1908, p. 129). In order to provide structure to the discussions that would place during the conference, the Russians dispatched circulars that entailed the topics of concern. The circular note, which resembled that of Hay, included the following points (Davis, 1975, pp.135-36):
a) Improvements for the Permanent Court of Arbitration
b) Additions to the provisions on land warfare
c) Convention on maritime warfare and improvement on existing laws
d) Additions to the 1899 Conference for adapting maritime warfare along the lines of the Geneva Convention
Overall, the Russians along with the Dutch did their homework extensively in the preparation for the Second Hague Conference. Despite their efforts, there was dissatisfaction amongst the participating countries. The United States and Germany had different views on disarmament; Germany explicitly stated that it was opposed to the idea of disarmament (United States Department of State, 1907, p.1101), while the United States reserved the right to bring the topic to the conference (Leopold, 1954, p.55). Despite these reservations, the convention was scheduled to go ahead, although it was postponed due to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904.
III. THE CONFERENCE
The delegates of the participating countries of the Second Hague Peace Conference met on June 15th, 1907 at The Hague (Scott, 1972, p.107). The gathering saw its membership jump to forty-four, with the inclusion of several Central and South American countries. It can be attributed to the American pressure to have these countries represented to boost its own standing in the conference. The other major players included the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary to name a few.
The next step in the conference was to divide it into commissions; this was done by the Russian diplomat Aleksander Nelidov. He divided the conference into four commissions of:
a) First Commission: Arbitration
This commission dealt with the obligatory arbitration that was much emphasized during the First Hague Conference. The very purpose of the Conference was for promoting peaceful settlement of international disputes. Arbitration was seen as the best way of settling such disputes, but there were reservations amongst the participants when it came to actually signing to all matters of arbitration (Scott, 1972, p.126). It has to be noted that most of those opposed were big powers; in this context, it makes sense that the powerful countries do not want to bargain on their sovereignty and rights to self-determination when they could actively take part in power politics and not be bound by international obligations. Germany was one such country which opposed obligatory arbitration in a global level; the German delegate at the Conference stated that Germany was not against arbitration, but it preferred bilateral agreements with countries rather than to have it as a global treaty (Hull, 1970, p.313).
On the other hand, the United Kingdom and the United States supported the proposal. The United States went to the extent of proposing a standing court to oversee arbitration in the international arena. It was named the Court of Arbitral Justice by the American delegates, which would transform the older court created by the First Convention into a court of 15 judges (Patterson, 1976, p.160). The American delegates acted on the essence that this would be a step forward for the closing of communication gaps and fostering understanding between states; it would be a just place for nation-states to exhaust all other options before going to war. The proposal seemed attractive to many countries but the delegates failed to address the issue of the election of judges. Thus, the proposal was not adopted (Leopold, 1954, p.57). Perhaps this could be explained through the notion of equality before law; smaller countries wanted equal treatment in the proposal but it could be the case that the greater powers want a bigger stake in such an influential international body.
b) Second Commission: Land Warfare
The second commission was assigned the responsibility of dealing with land warfare. It included two smaller commissions: the first one dealing with improving laws and customs of land warfare, while the second one was concerned with opening hostilities and the rights and responsibilities of neutral parties. It seems pretty ironic that the conference to ameliorate warfare was in fact discussing methods of conducting it.
The first sub-commission analyzed the laws and customs of land warfare that were covered by the First Hague Conference. It did not make any inclusion of new laws to the already widely accepted articles that regulated land warfare. The commission did renew the ban on throwing projectiles from balloons, as its term had expired in 1904 (Dodd, 1908, p.299). As far as the general principles regarding conduct of war on land goes, almost all of them remained the same as the sub-commission did not alter any of the articles that were already in place since the First Hague Conference.
The second sub-commission dealt with the opening of hostilities and the rights and responsibilities of the neutral parties. The proposal for the need to have opening formalities can be traced back to Russia’s defeat at the hands of Japan during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, when Japanese forces attacked Port Arthur without prior notice (Davis, 1975, p.208). Russia and France pressed for declaration of war before launching military attacks as a formality that was to be fulfilled. It created a sense of polarization between the participating countries. The United States and Britain did not like the idea of the war formalities, but the delegates finally agreed to declare intentions before opening hostilities after a provision was introduced. It stated that the neutral states could not ignore the state of war, whether they had received information prior or not (Scott, 1972, p.133).
The other responsibility of the second sub-commission was regarding the rights and responsibilities of neutral states. The Conference strengthened the position of such states through various additions to the already existent laws. It was reasserted at the Conference that the territories of the neutral states are inviolable by the belligerents and that the latter cannot move armies or armaments through the territories of the former (Davis, 1975, p.212). The articles that were formulated by the members of this sub-commission allowed for additional rights to the neutral states. It included the prohibition on recruitment by belligerent forces in neutral territories, and the freedom of neutral states to trade arms and ammunitions with belligerent states. The sub-commission forbade the coercion of neutral states into obstructing means of communication on behalf of the states that are at war. Overall, this section expands on the rights of neutral states during the time of war, enhancing their safety.
c) Third Commission: Naval Warfare
The Third Commission of the Conference dealt with the problems of naval warfare. It was divided into two section: the first dealt with the bombardment of cities and other inhabited areas and the usage of torpedoes, while the second covered the rights of belligerent ships in neutral ports and adaptation of the 1899 maritime principles to the Geneva Convention (Scott, 1972, p.133). This section of the Conference was of utmost importance to Britain, as it was the maritime power of the era, yet all the great powers of the day were nervous.
The first section of the Third Commission forbade naval attacks on undefended ports, cities, and villages. It was an initial proposal by the United States, which was adopted by unanimous support of the delegates (Hull, 1970, p.101). There was a condition to this provision: the undefended habitations had to comply with formal demand for “stores or provisions necessary to the present needs of the naval force near it,” or they could use force (Hull, 1970, p.103). In regards to the usage of torpedoes and mines, there were certain restrictions that were put in place for belligerents. The usage of torpedoes was banned unless it became harmless as soon as its purpose was fulfilled. The Commission further put restrictions on mines that were used in the sea; all unanchored contact mines were to be banned unless they became harmless after an hour, and all anchored contact mines were prohibited as well unless they became useless after breaking from the anchor (Dodd, 1908, p.299). These seem to be means by which to control weapons of large destructive potential.
The second sub-commission decided that if the merchant ship of one country is at the port of another and hostilities break out between the two, the merchant ship would be allowed to depart for its destination (Dodd, 1908, p.299). This secured the non-combatant ships from coming to any harm. It was further decided that to make maritime warfare adapt to the Geneva Convention, the hospital ships offer medical help to belligerent ships when the latter requests for it and not on their own initiative. The ships then becomes subject to specific protection and immunities (Hull, 1970, p.117). These hospital ships would have to hoist the flag of the Red Cross or Crescent and be subject to the control of the belligerent force to which it responded.
d) Fourth Commission:
The fourth commission included a plethora of subject matters, mostly related to naval issues. One of the main topics was the transformation of merchant ships into cruisers. Participating countries took differing positions on the issue. The Japanese wanted a total prohibition on such a provision, while the British wanted all vessels included in transportation of troops, supplies or the like to be treated as “auxiliary war vessels” (Hull, 1970, p.105). On the other hand, the Austrians and Germans wanted an agreement on allowing such a transformation, but prohibiting any retransformation during the time of war. Finally, a decision was made to allow merchant ships to be transformed into warships, only if they were placed under the direct authority of the country they were serving. The war ships also needed have external marks on them, signifying the country they represented (Hull, 1970, p.108).
One of the biggest concerns for the American delegates was the status of private property during time of war. The Americans strongly lobbied for it and wanted to have it applied for both land and naval warfare. However, the destruction of maritime trade was still a viable method of limiting the enemies. This led a stalemate at the Conference, as the Germans wanted the right to destroy the enemy merchant ships at high seas, while the British wanted the merchant ships to be free from such threats. Considering Britain’s elaborate maritime trade, it was not surprising to see such a stance on the issue. The American delegates reiterated their commitment to protection of all merchant ships, except for those carrying contraband or trying to breach blockades (Dodd, 1909, p.301).
The Commission further discussed the rights of captured merchant ships and their crews. Only those crew members belonging to neutral countries would not be made prisoners of war, even if the ships belonged to the enemy. Once again, this provision broadens the rights of neutral countries and its citizens. The inviolability status was also extended to small coastal fishing boats and postal mail originating or destined to ports that are not subject to blockades (Hull, 1970, p.146). Apart from the aforementioned decisions, discussions were carried out on the topics of blockade, and the destruction of neutral prizes. While the topic of blockade was deferred until the next conference, the question of what would happen to neutral ships that carry troops and contraband still loomed large. The decision was made to allow the neutral powers to admit such vessels but the indecisiveness on the issue of destruction of the prize forced the Commission to postpone the decision till the next meeting.
To complement the rights of neutral rights, a proposal was also made for the creation of an international prize court of appeal that would be independent from the court of the captors of neutral vessels. This idea too fell flat, as countries had issues regarding the choosing of the judges and the disproportionate influence of bigger powers (Davis, 1975, p.226).
e) Conclusion of the Conference
The Second Hague Conference was indecisive on many of the major issues concerning the international community at the time. It did allow for the expansion of neutral rights on many different fronts and opened the conversation on creating international courts, namely the Court of Arbitral Justice and the international prize court of appeal. Although both of them did not materialize, the Conference was a gathering unlike anything that had existed before as forty-four countries had taken part in it. Overall, the Conference failed to take concrete decisions on obligatory arbitration, arms limitation and the creation of the courts; yet, it succeeded in creating a platform for international discourse.
Irdynamics's Weblog
December 3, 2012 at 12:07 am
II. BACKGROUND
The Second Hague Conference held in 1907 traces its roots to the First Hague Conference of 1899. As peace sentiments grew throughout Europe following the Napoleonic Wars, it was the initiative of Tsar Nicholas II of Russia that led to the First Conference. The Hague was chosen as the venue for the gathering, which convened on May 18th, 1899 and coincided with the birthday of the Tsar (Hull, 1970, p.2). The Conference was divided into three commissions: limitation of armaments, laws of war, and arbitration. The first commission dealt with restricting the production and expansion of new weapons. Germany had strongly disagreed to any limitations on armaments (Davis, 1975, p. 33), signaling the rocky path that the Conference was undertaking. Considering the balance of power tactics utilized by the European powers of the era, it was not surprising that the major powers of the time had reservations relating to containment of arms advancement and production. Thus, the commission related to arms limitation concluded on the possibility of an agreement in the future, which in no way limited advancement or production of armaments.
The laws of war also faced a similar fate, with a majority of the propositions including prohibitions of marine cannons and torpedo boats, as well as neutrality rights of neutral states being deferred until the next conference (Hull, 1970, pp.450-453). The only exception was the development of what it seemed like a rudimentary version of a world court, named the Permanent Court of Arbitration. It was limited to interpreting arbitrary laws that were taken up by the parties involved (Scott, 1972, p.81). Thus, the First Hague Conference left many unanswered questions, hinting to the possibility of future international conferences.
The seeds of the Second Hague Conference were sowed in the United States. It started with the presentation of a list of resolutions adopted by the organization of international lawmakers called the Interparliamentary Union in 1904. The organization called for a review of the subjects postponed during the First Hague Conference, negotiation of arbitration treaties, and the establishment of an international congress to discuss global issues (Scott, 1972, p.90). The then US president Theodore Roosevelt took upon the endeavor and allowed for it to develop further. Roosevelt’s Secretary of State John Hay drafted circular notes on arbitration treaties and materials for the New Hague conference, as President Roosevelt called for a second peace conference (Davis, 1975, p.112). Considering the fact that the Russians were the ones who initiated the First Hague Conference, the Americans deferred the organizing of the conference to them. The Russians collaborated with the Dutch to plan the second peace conference in The Hague (Scott, 1908, p. 129). In order to provide structure to the discussions that would place during the conference, the Russians dispatched circulars that entailed the topics of concern. The circular note, which resembled that of Hay, included the following points (Davis, 1975, pp.135-36):
a) Improvements for the Permanent Court of Arbitration
b) Additions to the provisions on land warfare
c) Convention on maritime warfare and improvement on existing laws
d) Additions to the 1899 Conference for adapting maritime warfare along the lines of the Geneva Convention
Overall, the Russians along with the Dutch did their homework extensively in the preparation for the Second Hague Conference. Despite their efforts, there was dissatisfaction amongst the participating countries. The United States and Germany had different views on disarmament; Germany explicitly stated that it was opposed to the idea of disarmament (United States Department of State, 1907, p.1101), while the United States reserved the right to bring the topic to the conference (Leopold, 1954, p.55). Despite these reservations, the convention was scheduled to go ahead, although it was postponed due to the Russo-Japanese War of 1904.
III. THE CONFERENCE
The delegates of the participating countries of the Second Hague Peace Conference met on June 15th, 1907 at The Hague (Scott, 1972, p.107). The gathering saw its membership jump to forty-four, with the inclusion of several Central and South American countries. It can be attributed to the American pressure to have these countries represented to boost its own standing in the conference. The other major players included the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Austria-Hungary to name a few.
The next step in the conference was to divide it into commissions; this was done by the Russian diplomat Aleksander Nelidov. He divided the conference into four commissions of:
a) First Commission: Arbitration
This commission dealt with the obligatory arbitration that was much emphasized during the First Hague Conference. The very purpose of the Conference was for promoting peaceful settlement of international disputes. Arbitration was seen as the best way of settling such disputes, but there were reservations amongst the participants when it came to actually signing to all matters of arbitration (Scott, 1972, p.126). It has to be noted that most of those opposed were big powers; in this context, it makes sense that the powerful countries do not want to bargain on their sovereignty and rights to self-determination when they could actively take part in power politics and not be bound by international obligations. Germany was one such country which opposed obligatory arbitration in a global level; the German delegate at the Conference stated that Germany was not against arbitration, but it preferred bilateral agreements with countries rather than to have it as a global treaty (Hull, 1970, p.313).
On the other hand, the United Kingdom and the United States supported the proposal. The United States went to the extent of proposing a standing court to oversee arbitration in the international arena. It was named the Court of Arbitral Justice by the American delegates, which would transform the older court created by the First Convention into a court of 15 judges (Patterson, 1976, p.160). The American delegates acted on the essence that this would be a step forward for the closing of communication gaps and fostering understanding between states; it would be a just place for nation-states to exhaust all other options before going to war. The proposal seemed attractive to many countries but the delegates failed to address the issue of the election of judges. Thus, the proposal was not adopted (Leopold, 1954, p.57). Perhaps this could be explained through the notion of equality before law; smaller countries wanted equal treatment in the proposal but it could be the case that the greater powers want a bigger stake in such an influential international body.
b) Second Commission: Land Warfare
The second commission was assigned the responsibility of dealing with land warfare. It included two smaller commissions: the first one dealing with improving laws and customs of land warfare, while the second one was concerned with opening hostilities and the rights and responsibilities of neutral parties. It seems pretty ironic that the conference to ameliorate warfare was in fact discussing methods of conducting it.
The first sub-commission analyzed the laws and customs of land warfare that were covered by the First Hague Conference. It did not make any inclusion of new laws to the already widely accepted articles that regulated land warfare. The commission did renew the ban on throwing projectiles from balloons, as its term had expired in 1904 (Dodd, 1908, p.299). As far as the general principles regarding conduct of war on land goes, almost all of them remained the same as the sub-commission did not alter any of the articles that were already in place since the First Hague Conference.
The second sub-commission dealt with the opening of hostilities and the rights and responsibilities of the neutral parties. The proposal for the need to have opening formalities can be traced back to Russia’s defeat at the hands of Japan during the Russo-Japanese War in 1904, when Japanese forces attacked Port Arthur without prior notice (Davis, 1975, p.208). Russia and France pressed for declaration of war before launching military attacks as a formality that was to be fulfilled. It created a sense of polarization between the participating countries. The United States and Britain did not like the idea of the war formalities, but the delegates finally agreed to declare intentions before opening hostilities after a provision was introduced. It stated that the neutral states could not ignore the state of war, whether they had received information prior or not (Scott, 1972, p.133).
The other responsibility of the second sub-commission was regarding the rights and responsibilities of neutral states. The Conference strengthened the position of such states through various additions to the already existent laws. It was reasserted at the Conference that the territories of the neutral states are inviolable by the belligerents and that the latter cannot move armies or armaments through the territories of the former (Davis, 1975, p.212). The articles that were formulated by the members of this sub-commission allowed for additional rights to the neutral states. It included the prohibition on recruitment by belligerent forces in neutral territories, and the freedom of neutral states to trade arms and ammunitions with belligerent states. The sub-commission forbade the coercion of neutral states into obstructing means of communication on behalf of the states that are at war. Overall, this section expands on the rights of neutral states during the time of war, enhancing their safety.
c) Third Commission: Naval Warfare
The Third Commission of the Conference dealt with the problems of naval warfare. It was divided into two section: the first dealt with the bombardment of cities and other inhabited areas and the usage of torpedoes, while the second covered the rights of belligerent ships in neutral ports and adaptation of the 1899 maritime principles to the Geneva Convention (Scott, 1972, p.133). This section of the Conference was of utmost importance to Britain, as it was the maritime power of the era, yet all the great powers of the day were nervous.
The first section of the Third Commission forbade naval attacks on undefended ports, cities, and villages. It was an initial proposal by the United States, which was adopted by unanimous support of the delegates (Hull, 1970, p.101). There was a condition to this provision: the undefended habitations had to comply with formal demand for “stores or provisions necessary to the present needs of the naval force near it,” or they could use force (Hull, 1970, p.103). In regards to the usage of torpedoes and mines, there were certain restrictions that were put in place for belligerents. The usage of torpedoes was banned unless it became harmless as soon as its purpose was fulfilled. The Commission further put restrictions on mines that were used in the sea; all unanchored contact mines were to be banned unless they became harmless after an hour, and all anchored contact mines were prohibited as well unless they became useless after breaking from the anchor (Dodd, 1908, p.299). These seem to be means by which to control weapons of large destructive potential.
The second sub-commission decided that if the merchant ship of one country is at the port of another and hostilities break out between the two, the merchant ship would be allowed to depart for its destination (Dodd, 1908, p.299). This secured the non-combatant ships from coming to any harm. It was further decided that to make maritime warfare adapt to the Geneva Convention, the hospital ships offer medical help to belligerent ships when the latter requests for it and not on their own initiative. The ships then becomes subject to specific protection and immunities (Hull, 1970, p.117). These hospital ships would have to hoist the flag of the Red Cross or Crescent and be subject to the control of the belligerent force to which it responded.
d) Fourth Commission:
The fourth commission included a plethora of subject matters, mostly related to naval issues. One of the main topics was the transformation of merchant ships into cruisers. Participating countries took differing positions on the issue. The Japanese wanted a total prohibition on such a provision, while the British wanted all vessels included in transportation of troops, supplies or the like to be treated as “auxiliary war vessels” (Hull, 1970, p.105). On the other hand, the Austrians and Germans wanted an agreement on allowing such a transformation, but prohibiting any retransformation during the time of war. Finally, a decision was made to allow merchant ships to be transformed into warships, only if they were placed under the direct authority of the country they were serving. The war ships also needed have external marks on them, signifying the country they represented (Hull, 1970, p.108).
One of the biggest concerns for the American delegates was the status of private property during time of war. The Americans strongly lobbied for it and wanted to have it applied for both land and naval warfare. However, the destruction of maritime trade was still a viable method of limiting the enemies. This led a stalemate at the Conference, as the Germans wanted the right to destroy the enemy merchant ships at high seas, while the British wanted the merchant ships to be free from such threats. Considering Britain’s elaborate maritime trade, it was not surprising to see such a stance on the issue. The American delegates reiterated their commitment to protection of all merchant ships, except for those carrying contraband or trying to breach blockades (Dodd, 1909, p.301).
The Commission further discussed the rights of captured merchant ships and their crews. Only those crew members belonging to neutral countries would not be made prisoners of war, even if the ships belonged to the enemy. Once again, this provision broadens the rights of neutral countries and its citizens. The inviolability status was also extended to small coastal fishing boats and postal mail originating or destined to ports that are not subject to blockades (Hull, 1970, p.146). Apart from the aforementioned decisions, discussions were carried out on the topics of blockade, and the destruction of neutral prizes. While the topic of blockade was deferred until the next conference, the question of what would happen to neutral ships that carry troops and contraband still loomed large. The decision was made to allow the neutral powers to admit such vessels but the indecisiveness on the issue of destruction of the prize forced the Commission to postpone the decision till the next meeting.
To complement the rights of neutral rights, a proposal was also made for the creation of an international prize court of appeal that would be independent from the court of the captors of neutral vessels. This idea too fell flat, as countries had issues regarding the choosing of the judges and the disproportionate influence of bigger powers (Davis, 1975, p.226).
e) Conclusion of the Conference
The Second Hague Conference was indecisive on many of the major issues concerning the international community at the time. It did allow for the expansion of neutral rights on many different fronts and opened the conversation on creating international courts, namely the Court of Arbitral Justice and the international prize court of appeal. Although both of them did not materialize, the Conference was a gathering unlike anything that had existed before as forty-four countries had taken part in it. Overall, the Conference failed to take concrete decisions on obligatory arbitration, arms limitation and the creation of the courts; yet, it succeeded in creating a platform for international discourse.